





















Trade Unions and Democratisation in Africa
Piet Konings
Introduction
In the last decade a considerable number of studies have been published
on the process of democratisation in Africa1. Nevertheless, some
conspicuous lacunae still exist in the growing body of literature. In a recent
overview, Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot mention that the role of certain civil
society organisations in the democratie transition process, in particular trade
unions, has been almost completely ignored2.
This apparent neglect is not altogether surprising. Several Africanists
take an extremely pessimistic view of the role of trade unions in the African
post-colonial state. They look upon trade unions as weak organisations with
close ties to ruling authoritarian regimes and with vested interests in the
status quo. Some attempt to justify their position by emphasising that trade
unions are usually not only small, organising only a tiny minority of the
working population in the predominantly agrarian societies in Africa, but
also subordinated to state control in the aftermath of independence for the
sake of «national development». Others claim that trade union members
form a privileged minority in African societies, a so-called «labour
aristocracy», enjoying higher incomes and living Standards than the rural
majority, and that trade unions pursue narrow self-interests at the expense of
the urban and rural poor, taking advantage of better Organisation, and being
in collusion with the ruling elite3. Little wonder that these authors have low
1. One recent comparative study is Bratton, M., and Van de Walle, N., 1997.
2. Buijtenhuijs, R., and Thiriot, C., 1995, pp. 63-64.
3. See, for instance, Arrighi, G., and Saul, J.S., 1973; Lipton, M., 1977; Bates, R.,
1981. It is interesting to observe that both the World Bank and some African leaders, like
Rawlings in Ghana, have often used similar arguments to legitimise the anti-labour measures
in Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and to suppress any trade union Opposition.
See Kraus, J., 1991; Bangura, Y., and Beekman, B., 1993; Adesina, J., 1994; Gibbon, P.,
1995. It was only in 1995 that the World Bank openly acknowledged the important role of
trade unionism in the stabilisation of the democratie process and the functioning of the labour
markets. See World Bank, 1995.
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expectations of the role of trade unions in the process of political change.
Although Buijtenhuijs has presented a somewhat more nuanced view on
trade unions in Africa, hè, too, appears to have little faith in the political
potential of organised labour, focusing instead on the study of peasant
rebellions4.
These views have been contested by other Africanists, particularly those
who have carried out intensive research on trade unions in Africa5. They are
ready to admit that trade unions in Africa show a number of weaknesses, but
they equally stress that trade unions are among the few organisations that
have been able to survive the onslaught on civil society by authoritarian
post-colonial regimes. They argue that African governments have found it
hard to control trade unions. Trade unions, in fact, were able to preserve at
least some autonomy, varying on a continuüm from low (in former African
socialist states, including Guinea, Ghana, Tanzania, and some Francophone
countries like Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Togo), to medium (Mali, Senegal
and Nigeria), and high (Burkina Faso and Zambia). Even in countries where
post-colonial governments did achieve a large measure of control at the
national level by co-opting trade union leaders into the regime, they often
failed to control unions at regional and local levels6. Paradoxically, certain
state corporatist strategies, like the centralisation of the trade union
movement, the allocation of substantial funds, the introduction of the check-
off System7, and assistance in trade union education tended instead to
strengthen the organisational capacity of the unions, which, in turn, was of
great significance to future union struggles for autonomy8. Some of these
authors have also severely criticised the «labour aristocracy» thesis on
empirical and theoretical grounds9. Even if one could demonstrate the
general applicability of a substantial income gap between lower skilled
workers and the peasantry, which has obviously become more doubtful
during the structural adjustment period, the thesis would still be
unconvincing. It is simply too crudely materialist to draw an immediate link
between objective conditions and political behaviour.
This latter group of authors tend to be more optimistic than the former
about the role of trade unions in African post-colonial states. They usually
refer to certain specific factors which guarantee trade unions an exceptional
position among other civil society organisations. First, trade union members
may form only a small proportion of the working population in Africa but
they are concentrated in the cities and active in strategically important
sectors of the economy. As such, they may exercise considerable political
4. See Buijtenhuijs, R., 1975, and 1991.
5. See, for instance, Sandbrook, R., and Cohen, R., 1975; Agier, M. et al, 1987;
Freund, B., 1988.
6. See, for instance, Bates, R., 1971; and Konings, P., 1993.
7 . This is a system whereby union dues are automatically deducted from workers'
wages and paid to the unions.
8. Hashim, Y., 1994; Akwetey, E.O., 1994.
9. See, for instance, Waterman, P., 1975; Sandbrook, R., 1982; Jamal, V., and
Weeks, J., 1993; Adesina, J., 1994.
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power, being potentially capable of paralysing the economy and threatening
the regime in power. Second, trade unions belong among the oldest civil
society organisations with a long history of struggles against oppressive and
exploitative regimes. They have often played a leading role in the fight for
independence. Although subject to state control in the post-colonial era, they
have nevertheless proved capable from time to time of calling general
strikes against corrupt, elitist and authoritarian regimes in countries like
Senegal (1961), Ghana (1961, 1971), Nigeria (1964, 1971, 1981), Congo-
Brazzaville (1963, 1968), Burkina Faso (1961, 1975), Sudan (1958, 1964),
Madagascar (1972), and Ethiopia (1974)10. On such occasions, it became
manifest that trade unions were able to mobilise support beyond their own
membership. Small producers and traders in the expanding informal sector,
who usually maintain close relations with workers, and students were
particularly inclined to support their actions11. Third, trade unions often
enjoy a higher degree of international solidarity than other civil society
organisations. International trade union organisations and the International
Labour Office (ILO) in Geneva have frequently requested authoritarian
regimes to release trade union leaders from prison and to ensure a minimum
of trade union liberties12.
Given such factors and the protracted economie and political crisis facing
most African countries, these authors expect trade unions to play an
important role in current struggles for a democratie transition. They claim
that workers hold the authoritarian, and often corrupt, regimes responsible
for their predicament in the economie crisis and subsequent Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), leading to a widespread loss of legitimacy
in these regimes among the labour force13. Confronted with retrenchments,
curtailments in pay and suspension of benefits, managerial efforts to
intensify supervision and increase labour productivity, soaring consumer
prices, and user charges for public services, workers will bring considerable
pressures to bear upon the unions to cut their ties with the regime in power
and join the struggle for a democratie transition, which, according to them,
is more likely to raise prospects for «good governance» and an
improvement in their lot.
Recent research, however, presents a more complex picture of the role of
unions in the democratie transition than both the pessimistic and optimistic
schools of thought tended to offer us. There actually appears to be a large
Variation in this role14. In this article I have selected three-case studies for
an in-depth comparative analysis : Zambia, Ghana, and Cameroon. They are
not only cases with which the author is familiär, they also reflect variations
in the degree of intensity of the unions' role in the democratie process,
10. Sandbrook, R., 1982.
11. See, for instance, Jeffries, R., 1978 ; Peace, A., 1979 ; and Freund, B., 1988.
12. Kester, G., and Sidibé, O.O., 1997, p. 33.
13. See, for instance, Gibbon, P. et al., 1992 ; Bangura, Y., and Beekman, B., 1993
; Akweley, E.O., 1994.
14. See, for instance, Bratton, M., and Van de Walle, N., 1992 ; Akwetey, E.O.,
1994 ; Kester, G., and Sidibé, O.O., 1997.
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varying from high in Zambia, medium in Ghana, and low in Cameroon. I
want to demonstrate that these variations depend not only on differences in
the unions' organisational strength and previous state-union relations, but
also on the unions' willingness to involve themselves directly in the creation
of formal democracy, in particular in the form of a multi-party system. Our
case-studies suggest that unions in Africa, particularly in the English-
speaking countries, are more likely to fight for autonomy versus the state
and for a larger degree of participation in the national decision-making
process than to support or join Opposition forces in their struggle for the
establishment of a multi-party system. Two factors may explain this
Situation. First, the colonial rulers, and particularly the English ones,
advised the unions to stay away from direct involvement in politics,
especially in the form of seeking any alliances with political movements and
parties, as ultimately being harmful to the unions' representation of
workers' interests. Although the unions have not always adhered to this
advice, the colonial model of autonomous trade unionism has remained an
important reference ever since15. Second, civil society organisations' lack of
autonomy and participation in the national decision-making process were
key features of the post-colonial authoritarian state, preventing the unions
from effectively representing workers' interests. Trade union leaders
therefore regard the obtainment of trade union autonomy and a larger
degree of participation in the national decision-making process as essential
preconditions for both the defence of workers' interests and the development
of a democratie culture in society16.
Trade unions' simultaneous requests for autonomy and participation
clearly show that trade unions do not strive for complete disengagement
from the state, as some civil society theorists like Azarya17, would have us
believe. Trade unions instead aspire for a larger say in government policies
from an autonomous position. Trade union leaders are confident that they
will be in a better position to defend workers' interests if they participate in
regulär bilateral and tripartite committees and commissions dealing with
economie and wage matters. They are particularly bitter about the f act that
they have never been consulted in the planning and Implementation of SAPS
in spite of their nefarious effects on workers' living and working conditions.
The Zambian case
The Zambian trade union movement is among the strengest and most
militant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zambia used to have an exceptionally high
proportion of its working population in the labour force (between 25-30 %),
15. See Konmgs, P., 1993.
16. See Akwetey, E.O., 1994.
17. Azarya, V., 1988.
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most of whom were concentrated in its strategie industry - copper minin
This, of course, provided the trade union movement with considerab
leverage vis-ä-vis the state.
Similar to other trade unions in former British colonies in Africa, tl
Zambian trade union movement was founded on pluralist principle
enjoying a large measure of autonomy versus the colonial state. Howeve
when the struggle for national independence gathered momentum, a groi
of politically-oriented trade unionists vowed to support the United Nation
Independence Party (UNIP) as the most progressive party of the tim
Capitalising on the close relationship between the party and the trade uni(
movement, UNIP tried, after independence, to transform the trade unie
movement from units emphasising the interests of their rnembers in
production units, for the sake of rapid national development. Through an a
of parliament, one single trade union centre, the Zambian Congress of Tra<
Unions (ZCTU), was created, which was intended by the UNIP governme
to serve as an agent of control and a channel of communication for UNIF
policies to the workers. The results of this policy were dismal. The ZCT
proved incapable of establishing control over the workers, which manifest«
itself in a growing number of strikes despite continued calls for industri
peace from the ZCTU. In addition, the largest and best-organised unions,
particular those of the mine workers and the railway workers, consistent
opposed attempts at Subordination as they had opposed party control durii
the struggle for independence18.
Aware that its policies had largely failed, the UNIP government enacted
new Industrial Relations Act in 1971. While this act undoubtedly increasi
the incorporation of the union movement into the state apparatus,
ironically, also strengthened the organisational capacity of the trade uni<
movement in a number of ways. It stipulated that there would be only 01
union per industry, and that each union had to be affiliated to the ZCT1
Moreover, the act provided for the introduction of the check-off systei
The new act specifically required all unions to spend part of their funds <
workers' education. As a result of this act, the trade union moveme
showed a high degree of centralisation and unity, was well-fmanced, ai
devoted a great deal of attention to workers' education19.
While the strengthening of the union movement was legislated by tl
government to increase the unions' controlling function, from 1973 onwar
the ZCTU instead used its newly acquired strength to regain trade unit
autonomy and to oppose those government policies seen as harmful to t
workers. From a position of little populär acclaim, the ZCTU develop
into the unofficial national Opposition, particularly in the 1980s.
The first indication of the ZCTU's future oppositional role occurred
the wake of the government's declaration óf «One-Party Participato
Democracy» in 1973 and its subsequent attempt to transform the trade uni
1994.
18. See, for instance, Bates, R., 1971 ; and Rakner, L., 1992.
19. See, for instance, Bratton, M., 1994 ; Rakner, L., 1992 ; and Akwetey, E.<
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movement into a wing of the party. This attempt was resented within the
trade union movement and developed into a struggle for control of
leadership positions within the ZCTU. With the election of new, young
leaders such as Newstead Zimba as Secretary-General and Frederick Chiluba
as President in 1974, organised labour was slowly but defmitely moving
towards a type of trade union leadership that considered trade union
autonomy as the best guarantee for the representation and defence of
workers' interests, while rejecting any leader who accepted patronage posts
offered by the UNIP. The new leadership clashed with the government in
November 1974 when the government announced substantial consumer price
increases and proposed removing subsidies on bread and cooking oil. The
ZCTU organised street demonstrations in Lusaka and the Copperbelt,
forcing the government to back down.
Another fierce confrontation between the state and organised labour
occurred in the early 1980s when the trade unions opposed the enactment of
the Local Administration Act which sought to bring local administration in
line with the dictates of the one-party system20. The act tried to restrict the
election of local government councillors to party members only, thus
weakening the voting rights of Zambian citizens. 1t also proposed merging
the administration of urban centres and mine townships, thereby diluting the
welfare services available to mine workers. The government responded to
Opposition by the ZCTU and the mine workers' union to both measures by
suspending 17 labour leaders from the UNIP, which meant that they ceased
to hold union office. Four senior labour leaders, including Chiluba, were
detained for several weeks on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the
government. Miners reacted with a series of protest strikes during 1981.
The strikes only ended when the government allowed the labour leaders to
continue in their union positions, and agreed to remove the clauses that
would have integrated mine townships into the new district councils.
Lastly, the worsening economie crisis leading to a serious deterioration
in workers' living Standards compelled the unions to take the government to
task on questions of governance, public accountability and economie policy.
The government's signing of an agreement with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in 1983 seems to have been taken by the unions as a declaration
of war. Although the ZCTU was probably not directly involved in the 1986
and 1990 food riots, it took advantage of the populär uprising by blaming
the economie distress on the UNIP's mismanagement and corruption and the
authoritarian structures of the single-party state, resulting in an increasing
loss of legitimacy of the Kaunda government.
There were, however, three major reasons why the trade union
movement in Zambia became more directly involved in the struggle for the
introduction of formal democracy and pluralism at the end of the 1980s than
most other trade unions in Africa. First, there was the persistent refusal of
the Kaunda government to give in to repeated union demands to create some
1995.
20 See, for instance, Bratton, M., 1994 ; Simutanyi, N.R., 1992 ; and Mihyo, P.,
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'democratie' opening in the regime by allowing the unions to participate in
economie decision-making. Second, there was the determined effort of the
Kaunda government to cripple the union movement. The 1985 Statutory
Instrument no. 6 was issued by the government banning strikes and
removing the check-off system (the latter was intended to starve the unions
of the funds needed to mobilise workers against the structural adjustment
policies). The 1990 Industrial Relations Act repealed the Obligation for a
trade union to be affiliated to the ZCTU. This act was obviously intended to
underrnine the organisational cohesion of the trade union movement. Third,
there was the growing feeling that Chiluba in the context of deep public
alienation was the only national leader capable of challenging Kaunda.
Building on this reputation, Chiluba embraced the multi-party cause. At a
labour rally in 1989, in reference to Eastern Europe hè asked : «If the
owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are the
Africans to continue with it21.»
Rakner, however, rightly points out that the ZCTU leaders viewed the
unions' political role merely as a temporary arrangement22. They tended to
perceive the replacement of the single-party system by a multi-party system
as the best guarantee of the preservation of union autonomy, the
participation of the unions in the decision-making process, and «good
governance». After the introduction of a multi-party system, the trade unior
movement was to return to its «traditional» role of defending workers
interests.
The trade union movement in Zambia never aimed to become ar
alternative party. It worked instead in close co-operation with the othei
oppositional forces in society, becoming instrumental in forming th«
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1990. The role of the trad(
union movement in the political mobilisation process must be considere(
significant as the ZCTU was the only Organisation in Zambia, apart from tb
governing party, that possessed organisational resources enabling it to reacl
large sections of the population.
Following the victory of the MMD in the 1991 elections, the unions ha<
high expectations of the new government which included six former ZCTl
ministers. Their initial optimism, however, has rapidly given way to dee'
disillusionment. The Chiluba government has implemented SAP measure
even more rigorously than the former Kaunda government. It has labelle
wage demands by unions as sectional, selfish and disruptive to the economi
Programme. Strikes by workers are seen as irresponsible as they frighte
away foreign investment. Mass retrenchment of workers in the public sectc
has markedly weakened the trade union movement and union leaders hav
increasingly feit excluded from MMD policy-making. The MMD appears t
be as eager as the UNIP to keep the labour movement under governmei
control. Like its predecessor, the Chiluba regime has tried to encourag
close relations between the ruling party and the ZCTU. Suspicion that tl
21. Quoted in Bratton, M., 1994, p. 116.
22. Rakner, L., 1992, p. 134.
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government had manipulated the leadership contest of the ZCTU actually led
the mine workers' union and four other unions to secede from the ZCTU, an
action which was declared illegal by the Chiluba government as being in
clear contravention of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act. And, above all, the
Chiluba regime is increasingly being exposed as incompetent, corrupt and
factional. As the regime loses legitimacy, it cannot be ruled out that the
unions may again be in the forefront of democratie change in Zambia23.
The Ghanaian case
The Ghanaian trade union movement, like its Zambian counterpart, has
always been a potentially strong social force. Ghana used to have a
somewhat lower proportion of its working population in the labour force
than Zambia (approximately 24 %). Following independence in 1957, the
Nkrumah government and the leadership of the Ghana Trades Union
Congress (GTUC) decided to strengthen and centralise the organisational
structure of the trade union movement. Both parties agreed that a strong and
highly centralised trade union movement would make a significant
contribution to both the construction of a socialist state and the defence of
workers1 interests. The 1958 Industrial Relations Act transformed the
colonial trade union model of a large number of small and weak local unions
into a «new» model with a limited number of strong national unions,
introduced the check-off system, and allowed the GTUC considerable
power24. The trade union movement in Ghana, however, appears to have
been more exposed to government control, both under civilian and military
regimes, than the trade union movement in Zambia. Significantly, these
controlling efforts were not always successful, even at the highest level of
the trade union movement. Out of frustration, the Busia civilian government
(1969-1972) abolished the GTUC in 1971 feeling that this was the only way
of controlling the trade union movement.
When Rawlings took over power from the third civilian government in
Ghana on 31 December 1981, the labour movement was in a state of
disarray. The leadership of the GTUC was severely compromised in the eyes
of many of its members. In recognition of a series of measures favourable to
the labour movement, including the restoration of the GTUC in 1972, the
GTUC leadership had refused to support the protest actions of other civil
society organisations against the corrupt and authoritarian Supreme Military
Council (SMC). Neither had the GTUC leadership offered any effective
leadership in the labour disputes that destroyed the Third Republic25.
1978.
23. See Simutanyi, N.R., 1996.
24. See, for instance, Damachi, U., 1974 ; Konings, P., 1977 ; and Jeffries, R.,
25. See, for instance, Nugent, P., 1995 ; and Chazan, N., 1983.
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Shortly after the 1981 coup, a group of militant trade unionists in the Accra-
Tema area, organised in the so-called Association of Local Unions (ALU),
launched a putsch of its own, taking over power from the compromised
GTUC leadership - no doubt, with the silent support of the ruling
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). The PNDC also intervened
directly in the system of industrial relations by installing Workers Defence
Committees (WDCs) in every workplace without clarifying their
relationship with the existing union structure26. Apparently, the WDCs were
initially conceived as instruments to control of the labour movement27.
The PNDC implementation of a SAP in 1983 came as a shock to -the
workers who had been the main supporters of Rawlings's «revolution». This
led to a rapid loss of PNDC legitimacy among the workers. In particular,
the manner in which the April 1983 budget, announcing se.vere cuts in
public subsidies and price rises, had been presented seemed to demonstrate
that the PNDC was taking the labour movement for granted. The ALU
leadership of the GTUC, which remained strongly committed to the ideals of
the revolution, had not been consulted, but it nevertheless feit obliged to
«seil» the austere SAP measures to its members. Little wonder that it was
soon accused of betraying workers' interests and of being too subservient to
the Rawlings regime28. During the GTUC elections in December of the same
year, it was voted out of office and replaced by the «old guard» led by A.K.
Yankey. These «old guard» leaders were not concerned with safeguarding
the ideals of the revolution since they had been among the principal
casualties in 1982. They were more concerned with preserving trade union
autonomy versus the state and upholding what they considered the essential
task of unions : the defence of workers' interests, even if it meant
jeopardising the good relationship that had been established.
The new GTUC leadership immediately started criticising the
government for its lack of consultation and negotiation with the unions in
respect of decisions affecting the workers. It blamed the government for
«the unbearable conditions of the working people's lives as a result of the
imposed SAP measures», and it demanded the restoration of collective
bargaining procedures and union participation in the economie decision-
making process. In the highly repressive atmosphere of 1984-1987, the
GTUC feit constrained to resort to the militant mobilisation of workers to
back its demands. lts new Secretary-General, Mr A.K. Yankey, therefore,
sought to operate carefully, doubting the ability of the GTUC to survive a
war of attrition. Consequently, hè tried to make known the GTUC position
by the presentation of memoranda to the government, and press
Communications to the general public. This form of trade union protest
appeared to have little impact dn the government which persisted in its
unilateral style of decision-making, disregarding the GTUC in the process.
26. See, for instance, Konings, P., 1986 ; and Herbst, J., 1991.
27. Hansen, E., 1987, p. 179.
28. Yeebo, Z., 1991.
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The apparent futility of these pretests led the GTUC to consider other
methods of defending workers' interests. It began to strengthen the
organisational capacity of the unions and to mobilise the rank and file for
collective action. It reactivated the District Councils of Labour which
functioned as the link between local unions and the national leadership.
These District Councils succeeded to a large extent in regaining the support
of union members by stressing the new GTUC leadership's critical stance on
the SAP. The GTUC also mobilised the wider support of organised labour,
trying to create a common platform in defence of workers' interests.
Hitherto, Ghana's three profession-based public sector associations - the
Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), the Ghana Registered
Nurses' Association (GRNA), and the Civil Servants' Association of Ghana
(CSAG) - had been dealing with the government separately. A series of
high-level meetings led to the formation of the Consultative National Forum
of Ghana Labour in 1986. It was established to enable workers'
organisations in the country «to speak with one voice» and to act jointly
when dealing with the PNDC*».
In April 1986, the GTUC feit sufficiently strengthened to confront the
government in a more militant way when the latter unilaterally cancelled
leave allowances and end-of-service benefits for public sector workers. The
GTUC leadership told the government that lack of communication between
the regime and the unions left it with no other choice but to call a general
strike. It exhorted workers to wave red flags and wear red cotton bands (the
customary sign of mourning). The outrage expressed by ordinary workers
suggested that the strike enjoyed the overwhelming support of its members.
The PNDC did not resort to force, but swiftly reinstated the allowances and
end-of-service benefits. In addition, it soon reactivated tripartite institutions
and bilateral forms of consultation. By inviting the GTUC to serve on old
and new fora, the government met GTUC demands for channels of
consultation and participation.
That the PNDC regime backed down and responded positively to the
GTUC's request to participate in the national decision-making process on the
basis of organisational autonomy was mainly due to the following factors.
First, unlike the Kaunda government, the PNDC was by now prepared to
create a «democratie» opening in the regime. It had come to realise that
coercion was not an effective instrument of governance, particularly at a
time when most urban forces had become increasingly hostile to the
regime30. Having become aware of the increased organisational strength of
the GTUC, the PNDC found it politically astute to give the unions access to
the decision-making process rather than to forcibly confront it, which,
moreover, might permanently endanger the adjustment Programme. Second,
tripartite meetings were more institutionalised in Ghana than in Zambia,
where they used to be ad hoc, called irregularly, and mostly convened at the
1999.
29. Akwetey, E.O., 1994, pp. 88-89.
30. See, for mstance, Rothchild, D., 1991 ; Nugent, P., 1995 ; and Konings, P.,
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pleasure of the president. The reactivation of the tripartite institutions by the
PNDC removed a major source of the legitimation crisis. Subsequently
attention has shifted to the substance of the bargain struck by trade union
leaders in the tripartite fora.
Having obtained from the authoritarian regime what it regarded as two
of the major objectives of trade unionism in the defence of workers'
interests - a larger degree of autonomy and institutional participation - the
GTUC has been less inclined than the ZCTU to engage itself directly in the
struggle for formal democracy. By maintaining the «traditional» economie
role of trade unionism, it has been able to extract some concessions from-the
PNDC for its members and has avoided further confrontation and repression
by the regime.
During the period 1986-1992, the GTUC seldom made political demands,
but when it did, they were usually carefully presented in memoranda and
press Communications. In 1986, for example, the GTUC appealed to the
PNDC to install a People's Assembly composed of representatives of all
identifiable civil society groups and organisations, which would allow people
to make their views heard and also help the government to take decisions
which would be generally acceptable. This idea appeared to be reflected in
the PNDC establishment of District Assemblies in 198831. A few years later,
the GTUC called for the convening of a democratie «National Constituent
Assembly» to formulate a constitution which would then be submitted to the
people for approval, as well as for the introduction of a larger measure of
political liberalisation. Although these demands coincided with those of the
Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ), an umbrella Organisation of the
Opposition created in 1990, the GTUC refused to join this Organisation and
support its struggle for the introduction of multi-partyism in Ghana. And,
even more significantly, around the time that the campaign for multi-party
elections began, in the autumn of 1992, the GTUC constitution was amended
to prohibit the Organisation from entering into alliance with, or formally
supporting, any political party for the purposes of winning elections. This
amendment appears to have been motivated by (i) the GTUC's memory of
the harmful effects on the defence of workers' interests of previous alliances
with political parties (the Convention People's Party (CPP), 1958-1966 ; and
the Social Democratie Front (SDF), 1979-1981), and (ü) its lack of
confidence in the alternative constituted by the Opposition coalition to
Rawlings32. The GTUC, therefore, had come to the conclusion that it would
be in a better position to defend workers' interests if it preserved its
autonomy towards the political parties.
Following the victory of Rawlings's National Democratie Congress
(NDC) in the 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections, the GTUC
continued to fight for a larger say in government economie and wage
policies. Consultations and negotiations in the bilateral and tripartite fora did
not automatically lead to a significant improvement in workers' living and
31. See, for instance, Ayee, J.R.A., 1994 ; and Oquaye, M., 1995.
32. See Akwetey, E.O., 1994 ; and Nugent, P., 1995.
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working conditions or to any essential changes in government economie
policies. The government sometimes even refused to implement the decisions
arrived at in the bilateral and tripartite fora. Under strong pressure from
the rank and file, the GTUC leadership threatened to call a general strike on
these issues in January 1995. Subsequently, the government allowed the
tripartite fora to negotiate a new national minimum wage, and promised to
implement the decisions of the tripartite meetings33. The GTUC has also
made proposals for a revision of the SAP, and, in 1995, it requested the
government install a national forum about the state of the Ghanaian
economy, made up of the tripartite partners and important civil society
organisations. The GTUC has also accused the NDC government of
continued interference in trade unionism and industrial relations. In 1993,
for instance, it lodged a complaint with the ILO in Geneva about the NDC
government's interference in the system of collective bargaining.
The Cameroonian case
Although figures on labour participation are notoriously unreliable,
Cameroon appears to have had a smaller proportion of the working
population in its labour force than Zambia and Ghana (approximately
17 %). Trade unionism emerged in Cameroon in the mid 1940s. While
Francophone Cameroon had several trade union centres which were closely
affiliated with the metropolitan trade union centres for a long time, there
was only one trade union centre in Anglophone Cameroon, namely the West
Cameroon Trade Union Congress. Colonial trade unionism in both
Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon was characterised by a high degree
of militancy. Unlike their Francophone counterparts, Anglophone trade
union leaders appear to have disapproved of forming close alliances with the
nationalist movement and parties, having largely accepted the British-
imposed model of autonomous and economistic trade unionism34.
Following independence and reunification in 1961, however, the Ahidjo
regime gradually succeeded in merging all the existing trade union centres
into a single body, the National Union of Cameroon Workers (NUCW), and
in subordinating it to the state for the sake of national reconstruction. As I
have shown elsewhere35, Ahidjo's attempts to establish "total' control over
civil society were never fully successful. Although the NUCW leadership
was effectively co-opted into the «hegemonie alliance36», the central labour
Organisation failed to fully control regional and local trade unionism. The
1993.
33. Adu-Amankwah, K., and Tutu, K., 1997, pp. 265-266.
34. See, for instance, Joseph, R.A., 1977 ; Bayart, J.-F., 1979 ; and Konings, P.,
35. See Konings, P., 1993, and 1998.
36. Bayart, J.-F., 1979.
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close relationship between the state and trade unions continued under
Ahidjo's successor, Paul Biya. At the 1985 Bamenda Congress, Biya changed
the name of the single party from the Cameroon National Union (CNU) to
the Cameroon People's Democratie Movement (CPDM), and commended the
central labour Organisation for its constructive role in society. The National
Union of Cameroon Workers (NUCW), in turn, immediately changed its
name to the Cameroon Trade Union Congress (CTUC-), and its then
president, Mr J.-E. Abondo «thanked President Paul Biya a thousand times
for all that hè had done for the workers37». Soon after, Mr Abondo was
appointed Minister of Defence, a clear reward for his services to the regime.
While the corrupt and authoritarian Biya regime swiftly lost its
legitimacy during the severe economie and political crisis that hit Cameroon
from the mid 1980s onwards38, the CTUC continued to support the regime.
It never attempted to defend the workers' interests after the Biya regime was
compelled to impose a SAP in 1988/89. Like the ruling CPDM party, it
strongly condemned the increasing calls in civil society for political
liberalisation and the introduction of a multi-party system. When the first
Opposition party, the Social Democratie Front (SDP), was formed in the
Anglophone part of the country in 1990, the then CTUC president, Mr D.
Fouda Sima, expressed, like other CPDM loyalists, «his total rejection of
what the Head of State has called political models imported from abroad39».
Following the introduction of multi-partyism and a large degree of
freedom of speech and association in December 1990, one could observe a
growing dissatisfaction among the rank and file with the CTUC's
performance and its continuing alliance with the ruling CPDM party, which
manifested itself in a series of strikes and workers' support of the
Opposition. Even within the regional and local leadership of the CTUC one
could hear severe criticism of the CTUC's position and calls for the unions'
autonomy versus the state and political parties40. The president of the CTUC
in the Fako Division of Anglophone Cameroon, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, who
in the meantime had joined the Opposition, was to become the most vocal
opponent of the corrupt national leadership of the CTUC, openly
condemning it for its continued alliance with the ruling party and its
complete neglect of the defence of workers' interests during the economie
crisis and the SAP41. Moreover, hè advocated the unions1 direct involvement
in the struggle for the establishment of formal democracy. In February
1991,hedeclared:
«The workers expect an independent and strong trade union Organisation
that would be autonomous in relation to all political parties and state bodies
1998.
37. Foundation Friedrich-Ebert, 1994, p. 76.
38. See, for instance, Konings, P., 1996 ; and Takougang, J., and Krieger, M.,
39. Cameroon Tribune, 2 May 1990.
40. See, for instance, Mehler, A., 1997.
41. Konings, P., 1995, pp. 71-72.
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and institutions... This will relieve the trade unions of the rubber-stamp
element in the country's political life. If the trade union does not become more
militant and resolute in its demands, then the CTUC won't be of much help to
the workers42.»
Under mounting pressure, the CTUC finally recognised the right of its
members to join the political party of their choice on 2 April 1991. The
CTUC leadership nevertheless remained closely allied with the ruling party
and did not develop its own policy. In these circumstances, some of the
unions at the local and regional level tried to cut their ties with the CTUC.
The Fako Divisional Unions under the leadership of Vewessee, for example,
stopped transferring trade union dues to the CTUC. From 1991 onwards,
civil servants started creating strong independent unions, notably in the
educational sector. One of these unions, the university lecturers' Syndicat
national des enseignants du supérieur (SYNES), was created after security
forces ransacked university students' quarters in May 1991. The government
immediately declared it illegal, stressing that civil servants were prohibited
by law from forming unions. Subsequent attempts to intimidate and even
physically attack the leadership of the union were motivated by government
suspicion that the union was allied to the Opposition. After a complaint by
SYNES, the International Labour Office (ILO) insisted that civil servants in
Cameroon be given the right to unionise. The Biya government, however,
still refused to recognise SYNES, but later, in 1994, it decided to legalise a
few other, independent unions in the civil service43. It is noteworthy that the
newly formed civil service unions in the educational sector called general
strikes in January-February 1994 because of severe curtailments in, and
non-payment of, their salaries.
The new Labour Code of 1992 guaranteed trade union autonomy towards
the state, and the CTUC subsequently changed its name to the Confederation
of Cameroon Trade Unions (CCTU) to reflect its newly acquired
'autonomous' status. This did not mean the end of government intervention
in the unions, however. The government developed several strategies to keep
the unions under its control. The 1992 CCTU elections were clearly
manipulated by the government buying the support of a number of delegates
to make sure that Mr Etame Ndedi, the trade union representative in the
CPDM Central Committee, was elected President of the central labour
Organisation. The populär and outspoken Anglophone trade union leader,
Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, who had been the candidate of the autonomous trade
unions, was forced to withdraw his candidacy for the presidency prior to the
elections. He was accused by CPDM loyalists of striving to split the trade
union movement and form a union of his own. The government, however,
could not forestall the election of a number of autonomous trade union
leaders onto the CCTU executive. One of mem, Mr Louis Sombes, became
Secretary-General of the union.
42. Cameroon Post, 20-27 February 1991, p. 11.
43. Foundation Friedrich-Ebert, 1994, pp. 96-98.
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Government intervention in the union became even more overt in late
1993, when Mr Sombes was sacked by the union president, Mr Etame
Ndedi, who appeared to be more concerned with implementing government
decisions than with defending workers' interests. Sombes was accused oi
having attempted to call a general strike of civil servants in protest at two
severe cuts in their remuneration in 1993, amounting to 70 per cent of theii
previous salaries. Both the regime and the union president tried to prevent a
meeting of the union executive, the majority of whom advocated Sombes'j
reinstatement. Not even protests from the ILO could dissuade the
government from further intervening in the matter. In contravention of ILC
convention n° 87, the government openly supported the Installation of Mi
Jules Mousseni, a CPDM loyalist and Second Vice-Secretary-General of the
CCTU, who had been unilaterally nominated by Etame Ndedi as the new
Secretary-General of the union. This led the ILO to rebuff Etame Ndedi anc
the government at its June 1994 Annual Convention in Geneva by refusinj
to accredit Mousseni. Given the stalemate Sombes's dismissal had caused it
the union and the Geneva debacle, the First Vice-President of the CCTl
convened a meeting of the union executive in July 1994, which decided t<
reinstate Sombes and sack Etame Ndedi instead. A few months later, ii
September 1994, security forces raided the union headquarters in Yaoundi
and forcibly removed Sombes from office, throwing him into prison44.
Realising that not even the arrest of Sombes could prevent the CCTl
from asserting its autonomy, the regime decided to sponsor a rival trad'
union centre. In a confidential letter to the Head of State, the Minister o
Territorial Administration wrote : «I think the birth of this new trade unioi
Organisation will help counteract the activities of the leaders of the CCTl
who, in the majority, are members of the radical Opposition45». Shortl
afterwards, the regime allowed the convening of the inaugural meeting c
the new trade union centre, the Union of Free Trade Unions of Cameroo
(UFTUC). All the available evidence suggests that the UFTUC was to serv
as an instrument for the continuing incorporation of trade unionism into th
state. According to Salome Tsogo who was elected First Vice-President c
the UFTUC, «the success of the UFTUC will constitute a major victory fc
the CPDM46». Having obtained a large degree of autonomy, the CCTU vote
that «no matter what others may say about us, we will work with all th
other progressive forces to ensure that democracy at least fmds fertil
ground in the country47».
44. Ibid., p. 78 ; and Eboussi Boulaga, F., 1997, pp. 347-348.






This article has attempted to show that one has to be extremely careful in
making any pessimistic or optimistic generalisations about the role of trade
unions in Africa during the democratisation process. Our three case-studies
suggest a large Variation in the unions' role, depending not only on such
factors as the unions' organisational strength and previous state-union
relations, but also on the widespread reluctance of African unions,
particularly in the English-speaking countries, to engage in the creation of
formal democracy, notably in the form of a multi-party system. On the basis
of their experience with both colonial and post-colonial trade union models,
African unions have often been inclined to stay aloof from struggles to
introducé formal democracy, out of fear that any alliance with Opposition
movements or parties would eventually turn out to be harmful to their
representation of workers' interests. They have therefore preferred to fight
for autonomy versus the state and for a larger say in the national decision-
making process, which they consider to be essential preconditions for an
improvement in their defence of workers' interests and for the development
of a democratie culture in society.
Our case-studies have shown that Zambia was the only country where
trade unions became a leading force in the struggle for multi-partyism.
Significantly, this occurred only after the Kaunda regime had denied the
unions autonomy and access to the national decision-making process.
Strikingly, the Zambian unions appear to have considered their direct
involvement in the creation of formal democracy merely as a temporary
arrangement. They wanted to return to their «traditional» role of defending
workers' interests after the achievement of this objective. The Ghanaian
trade unions simply refused to support or join the Opposition after they had
compelled the Rawlings regime to allow them participation in the national
decision-making process from an autonomous position. Henceforth, the role
of Ghanaian trade unions in the creation of formal democracy has been
restricted to making some periodic statements on the need for constitutional
rule and a larger measure of political liberalisation. Unlike their Zambian
and Ghanaian counterparts, Cameroonian unions made no contribution
whatever to the introduction of multi-partyism. This was mainly due to the
continuing close fusion between the state and civil society in Cameroon. It
was only after the introduction of multi-partyism that Cameroonian unions
starled fighting for autonomy.
Our case-studies also provide evidence that the union struggle for
autonomy and a larger say in the national decision-making process as well as
for a democratie culture in society has not come to an end with the coming
into being of multi-party democracy in Africa. The new "democratie"
governments have continued to intervene in union affairs for the purpose of
political control and to deny, or restrict, union access to the decision-making
process. To consolidate their achievements and to make new inroads along
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the path to democracy, the unions should pay particular attention to the
following tasks :
- strengthening their Organisation. African unions have been weakened by
the Implementation of SAPs, leading to a considerable loss of membership.
This should encourage the unions even more than before to enlarge their
social base and to go beyond their traditional constituency by mobilising and
organising workers in the informal and rural sectors. Moreover, unlike the
Zambian unions which have severed their ties with other social forces in
society since multi-partyism, African trade unions should instead attempt to
enhance their position of power by seeking alliances with other civil society
organisations;
- improving upon their negotiating and bargaining position in national
decision-making fora. African unions used to simply criticise SAPs for their
harmful effects on workers' living and working conditions. They would be
taken more seriously in bilateral and tripartite organs if they came up with
alternative proposals aimed at an improvement in both the economie
Situation and workers' living and working conditions. This could be done in
close co-operation with universities and research Institutes;
- democratising their infernal Organisation and administration. The move
towards a more democratie governance in the wider society should also have
an impact on the internal administration of the trade unions themselves. The
introduction of regulär, secret and free elections at all levels and of internal
structures providing for accountability and the active participation oi
members in the governing of trade unions would be a major source ol
strength. Particular provision should be made for the inclusion of the youth
and women in the decision-making process.
African unions appear to be in a process of rapid change. In a recem
publication, Kester and Sidibé show that many African unions are alreadj
taking a number of measures to implement our recommendations48. This ii
encouraging !
48. Kester, G., and Sidibé, O.O., 1997.
